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Love of God and Unity of Wisdom in Plato and 
Leibniz 
Dr Tinu Ruparell 
University of Calgary 
IN what follows I wish to consider the following 
question, the relevance of which should be fairly 
obvious for a discussion on the love of God: 
does love flow from wisdom or wisdom flow 
from love?! The question is at the heart of much 
Christian reflection on the nature of the love of 
God and how it is to be known. Augustine· 
famously reflects on the source of his knowledge 
and love of God in book X of his Confessions 
where he concludes that God is truly within him 
and has always been SO.2 Only in and after 
recognition of this fact is love engendered. In a 
different vein, Ignatius of Antioch wrote to the 
Ephesian church that their faith "was the means 
by which [they] ascended, and [their] love the 
way which led up to God,,,3 and Ambrose, in his 
Letter to Simplician, suggests. that the love of 
God in Christ is. reflected in the sacrifice of 
Christ for the inchoate body, that is the Church. 
The wise, he goes on, are thus not afraid to be 
under bondage to Christ through service in the 
church, since this bondage is in reality freedom 
and service the gateway to making real the love 
of God. So Ambrose and Ignatius, contrary to 
Augustine, appear to privilege faithful 
commitment and unity (love) over knowledge 
(wisdom). But again the contrary side reappears 
with Pope Benedict in his first Christmas 
Encyclical, where he wrote that the union of 
God and human beings, " ... is no mere fusion, a 
sinking in the nameless ocean of the Divine; it is 
a unity which creates love, a unity in which both 
God and man remain themselves and yet become 
fully' one. As SaintPaul says: 'He who is united 
to the Lord becomes one spirit with him.'" (1 
Cor 6: 17)4 Suffice it to say that the issue is by 
no means settled. 
Some light might be shed on the question 
through considering two philosophers: the first 
thoroughly· Christianised, the second (at least 
nominally) Christian. 5 The relationship between 
love and wisdom is key for both Plato and 
Leibniz as each eventually arrives at a position 
where some form of ontological unity is the 
basis for salvific knowledge and, furthermore, 
this unity is either had through love or is its font. 
Love of God, for all each, intimately comlects 
wisdom and unity. What I wish to do is to 
clarify how each sees this connection. To begin 
the analysis let us start with Plato. 
Plato's discussion of love takes place 
primar:ily through three dialogues: the Lysis, the 
Symposium and the Phaedrus (though I shall 
here concern myself primarily with the first 
two). Through these dialogues we see Socrates 
expound on the 'art of love' (ta erotica), which, 
he memorably tells his fellow symposiasts, is the 
sole thing he claims to know. This rather 
remarkable claim from Socrates is in itself 
noteworthy since at his trial Socrates argues that 
his· wisdom consists solely in the fact that he 
realises that he knows nothing. 6 On the surface 
then, Socrates' claim in the Symposium is 
unique, possible contradictory and assuredly 
important. As we shall see below, we are right 
to pay particular attention to this statement since 
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in Socrates' 'Diotima' speech we see the real 
meaning behind his words, namely Platonism. 
Tuming to the Lysis we see Socrates in 
discussion with Hypothales on the subject of 
how best to speak to the object of one's 
affections in order to win him. Hypothales loves 
Lysis and is quite literally constantly singing his 
praises, recounting his many beauties and 
virtues, listing his great deeds and those of his 
ancestors, and generally pining for Lysis so 
much that he is now becoming quite a bore to 
those around him. Socrates chides Hypothales 
for eulogising Lysis over-generously, since no 
skilled lover would ever do so. For, as Socrates 
teaches, if after you have placed the object of 
your affections on such a high pedestal you 
succeed in securing him, you have in fact only 
succeeded in announcing your .own prowess at 
winning such a prize. Those who are wise in 
love, rather, only ever praise their beloved after 
they have them since they fear what the future 
may hold. (Lysis 206a) Praising your beloved 
to the skies before you have some commitment 
only makes your beloved big-headed and thus 
less likely to accept you, or if they do accept 
you, the flattery leaves them constantly second 
,guessing themselves as to whether they made the 
right choice or really could have done better. 
So humbled, Hypothales enquires as to the 
best way to speak to one's beloved, to which. 
Socrates then offers a master class in the art of 
questioning - elenctic - which is the real art of 
love. When Socrates says that he knows the art 
of love, Plato is making a play on words: 
between the noun eros and the verb erotan 
(meaning to question). So Socrates' prowess is . 
not in the art of love understood as sexual 
strategies or romantic manoeuvres, but rather in 
dialectic. Thus the true 'art of love' is 
philosophy· and Plato devotes a great deal of 
these three dialogues to making this claim. In so 
doing he subverts the then prevalent Athenian 
practice of paiderastia - the socially sanctioned 
sexual rdationship between older men and 
young teenaged boys through which youths were 
supposed to leam virtue. 
The history and social role of Athenian 
Paiderastia is a complex story and far too 
involved for my present purposes; however we 
should note that it was commonly understood to 
include at least two kinds of love: heavenly, 
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Uranian love whose object is the soul, and 
whose goal is the inculcation of virtue in the 
beloved; and common or Pandemotic love, 
whose object is the body and whose aim is mere 
sexual pleasure (Symposium180c-e). Heavenly 
love is solely homosexual since not only does it 
take the Goddess Urania (whose descent is 
always male) as its model but also because in 
such a relationship the possibility of lustful 
procreation is absent. 7 In the dialogues we are 
considering, Plato makes Socrates the agent of 
subversion, 8 or more accurately submersion of 
Pandemotic by Uranian love. The goal of love 
is, for Socrates, philosophical intercourse - the 
dialectical questioning which is key to 
apprehension of the form of the Good. So in the 
Lysis we see Socrates teach by example. He 
questions Lysis himself on the nature of 
friendship. These mock dialogues (ersatz 
because even more so than in other dialogues the 
interlocutor is turned into a Socratic yes-man) 
are set pieces or examples of the kind of 
dialectic required to do philosophy: they pose 
analytic questions conceming the nature of 
friendship per se in order slowly to winnow out 
mistaken and contradictory views. For instance, 
is the friend the lover or the beloved? Does 
friendship inhere in a relationship between like 
or unlike people? And what is the true basis of 
friendship, that is, what is it in the friend that is 
loved and thus makes them a friend? It is. only 
through such sustained dialectic that a true 
understanding of the subject of friendship can be 
had and, correspondingly, the nature of love is 
only grasped through the self-same form of 
philosophy. The true artist of love, then, must 
be first the lover of wisdom, for only through 
elenchus can one come to know what love is to 
begin with. Conversely, and with respect to the 
-Good, knowledge of the good can only come 
from proper practice of love of the good, which 
turns out to be philosophy. 
This point is made most forcefully in the 
Symposium, Plato's dramatic masterpiece on the 
nature of love. Socrates' speech in this dialogue 
comes in the form of the recounted wisdom of 
Diotima of Mantin~a, a woman whom Socrates 
credits as teaching him the art of love. 
According to Diotima, what we all love is the 
good, that is we all want for ourselves what is 
good and lasts forever. Alas, being mortals, this 
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is not our natural gift and the best we can do to 
satisfy our desire is to reproduce ourselves in an 
endless cycle thus "giving birth in beauty 
whether in body or soul" (Symposium 206b). 
Again there are two forms of love being referred 
to here: to give birth in beauty through the body 
is natural to heterosexual love, for through 
procreation parents give birth to children who 
resemble them and so share in their beauty. 
However the second form, homosexual love, (as 
idealised in Athenian paiderastia) gives birth to 
accounts of "wisdom and the rest of virtue" 
(209b). It is through this kind of love that 
dialectic flows towards its end III the 
apprehension of the Good. Moreover Diotima 
argues that the accounts of virtue spawned by 
paiderastic love are protected from falling into 
mere narcissism or vulgar physicality because of 
the elenctic nature of dialectic itself. The 
characteristic quality of dialectic is to question 
critically: what we would now refer to as the 
hermeneutics of suspicion. Diotima maintains 
that this quality of dialectic provides it a 
fundamental opemless to the world which 
guarantees it safety from· the crass or tawdry 
and, rather, propels the artful lover to beautiful 
accounts of virtue of a particular sort: those 
which can be used "in the proper ordering of 
cities and households" (209a), "which make 
young men better" (21 Oc) and "produce theories 
in unstinting love of wisdom" (philosophia) 
(210d). Diotima teaches that to love well is not. 
to pursue the beloved in myriad ways (the 
subject which engaged Socrates' interlocutors) 
but rather to love a different beloved. Diotima 
bids us love the fonn of beauty inherent in 
created beautiful instantiations. This does not 
mean that we give up on the object of our 
affections in pursuit of some higher form of love 
but rather that we see our natural beloved as but 
one form of the beautiful, and that it is the Form 
of beauty within our lover which is the real 
pnze. 
It is with the introduction of Platonic Fonns 
that we can finally tackle the question of love of 
God. It is no simplistic substitution to suggest 
that for Plato love of God is simply love of the 
Good. The Gods in Platonic dialogues rarely 
stand for themselves, so when Socrates speaks, 
for instance, of the Goddess of love in her two 
forms (Urania and Pandemos) acting in certain 
ways, he is really talking about humans acting 
according to love of the soul or love of the body. 
Love of God therefore must for Plato mean love 
of the triumvirate of the forms of Goodness, 
Beauty and Truth, and this, as \\:,e have seen 
from the Lysis pnd Symposium, is had through 
proper practice of the art of love, that is 
philosophy. Loving God in the appropriate way, 
that is a way which subverts and subsumes the 
ideals of Athenian pederasty such that through 
elenchus we see the Forms inherent in the 
beloved, results' in wisdom. But with this we 
should not assume that it is cold~blooded 
analysis to which we are being called .. The very 
fact that dialectic is understood as the art of love 
indicates that Plato's concern is for a 
fundamental openness to the world, an openness 
which excludes the merely rational in favour of 
a more holistic engagement with wisdom. 
Elenchtis is no mere science, not a mechanical 
application of critical tools to the object at hand, 
but rather a kind of phronesis or craft such that 
its proper practice is the result of imagination as 
well as analysis. The art of love as philosophia . 
is a negotiation from what is known into what is 
unknown and this requires a continuing 
openness to the revelation of the Good inherent 
in the world. Thus Plato's legacy for our 
understanding of the love of God and loving 
God is that we realise the immanence of God's 
love in the world and through the process of 
elenchus reveal the essential form of God's love 
within the beloved. 
This legacy is, of course, taken up in 
various ways in Christian history and before we 
move to look at Leibniz we should briefly veer 
towards the neo-platonic version of the love of 
God. 
Plato's Forms inherent in the world are 
given structure in Plotinus's depiction of the 
emanation of creation from the One. The One is 
identified with the Form of the Good by Plotinus 
and stands below or supports Being itself. 9 It is 
thus understood as constant and undiminished 
becoming and, as pure becoming, as the 
'thrown-ness' of Dasein in Heidegger's 
terminology, the One manifests the fundamental 
openness to the world which Plato was at pains 
to ensure through elenchus. Thus Plotinus, in 
rolling the Fonns into the ontological reality 
from which all else ensues, naturalises and 
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reifies elenctic openness to being. Moreover 
the particular way in which the One is identified 
with the fonn of the Good prepares the way for 
later Christians to identify the One with the 
logos, that is the rational Trinitarian counterpart 
to Platonic dialectic. If Plato tells us that the art 
of love is philosophy and that the true artist sees 
the form of Beauty in the beloved, Plotinus 
allows for Christians the Form of the Good, the 
True and the Beautiful to reside in. the One 
Christian godhead, known through Logos, itself 
incarnated to redeem creation. It is rather an 
elegant and fortuitous .piece of philosophy since 
it allows for the Christianisation of Plato's 
Forms in the concept of God and the valorisation 
of the elenchus in the form of the immanent 
logos. This immanence must now be carried to 
its logical end through a consideration of 
Leibniz. 
God in Leibniz's world is the perfect 
monad. In his Monadology he characterises the 
universe as composed of. monads which are 
immaterial, simple substances. (Monadology 
§l-IO)IO We are all, despite apparent sensory 
evidence to the contrary, simple, immaterial 
substances. The way we happen to look turns. 
out to be nothing more than 'WFP' (well 
founded phenomena), but in substance we are 
the same as God, the difference being merely in 
degree of perfection and knowledge (what 
Leibniz would classify together in terms of 
predicates). God is for Leibniz quintessentially 
the perfect being and creator of the universe. 
These are, as it were, the non-negotiable axioms 
at the heart of his theology. As a perfect, 
necessary being, God lacks' nothing yet creates 
the world out of itself without resultant 
diminishment. There is here more than a hint of 
Plotinus' One, in which Leibniz showed much 
interest. II The key aspect for our purposes is 
Leibniz's foundation of divine immanence in 
creation. God and world are intimately related 
since they are both fundamentally the same, 
simple, monadic substance, the differentiation 
between them obtaining through their relations 
to all others. These interrelationships Leibniz 
calls perceptions since they do not entail 
external causation - monads are famously 
'windowless'- however they are not sensory but 
rather logical. All monads, divine and 
otherwise, are interrelated in a system of logical 
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necessities governed by the law of sufficient 
reason whereby each monad is determined to be 
created as it is (with its particular predicates and 
relations) and not in some other way. 12 We are 
all thus interconnected in a web confonning to a 
necessary pre-established harmony. For Leibniz 
this harmony' is tantamount to the logos, the 
essential rationality of God's creation through 
and for which God is ultimately to be loved. 
Now the web of perceptions which 
connects all things and by which we know the 
universe and God is understood by us through 
what Leibniz calls apperception: equivalent to 
conscious . self-reflection. (Monadology § 15) 
The art of love practiced as philosophy is for 
Leibniz thus found through our reflective 
rational apperception, that is, reflection on the 
necessary interrelations between all monads. So 
where Plato argued that love of God/Good 
amounts to philosophical pursuit of the Beautiful 
as instantiated in beautiful things (thUS wisdom 
arises from love), and Plotinus reifies the Forms 
such that the One gives rise to the Forms now 
immanent in creation and known through the 
logos (thUS knowledge of God arises from 
wisdom), Leibniz disperses the essential nature 
of the one, perfect, creator God into all monads 
so as to establish the immanent Forms in 
substantial reality (thUS unity arises from 
knowledge of God). Moreover mutual 
perception of monads of each other as well as 
their own self, apperceptive, consciousness 
conforms to the supremely rational pre-
established harmony maintaining the 
relationships between monads. When we 
properly understand our connections to all 
monads and to God, we come to proper 
understanding of the nature of our true selves as 
substantially identical to God. For Leibniz 
therefore, true love of God can only come from 
a rational understanding of the perfection of his 
creation, organised before all time, to account 
for not only the initial state of every monad in 
existence but also all of their continuing changes 
and redescribed relations. The love of God can 
only spring from such an appreciation and 
awareness of God's necessary perfection and of 
creation arising from it. 
For Leibniz this rational reflection - which 
is indeed our only true activity since no monad 
causally acts on any other in an external sense -
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is a means by which we are made more perfect. 
I have already noted that for· Leibniz the 
essential characteristic of God is that it is the one 
perfect being, everything else is a limited 
reflection of God in so far as we are not aware of 
all of the various perceptual links between us 
and everything else - only God knows this - but 
through apperceptive reflection we are able to 
discover at least some part o(this and thus grow 
in our own perfection. The love of God, for 
Leibniz, springs from this growth in perfection, 
for as we more and more resemble God in the 
self knowledge of our accidental attributes, the 
more we take on the corollary knowledge and 
activity of God, namely the care for others and 
the desire for their perfection. Leibniz holds that 
God's love for us is his pleasure in our 
perfection, (Monadology §83-85) echoing the 
commitment to the world which for Plato and 
Plotinus was revelatory of the Forms. For 
Leibniz what is revealed is not the inherent 
beauty residing in the beloved, but rather the 
awareness of its growing ontological actuality 
and excellence. For Leibniz the attraction to our 
beloved is the necessary result of greater 
understanding of the true nature of reality. Love 
issues from wisdom which is knowledge of 
unity. 
I have now very briefly considered how 
Plato and Leibniz considered what it means to 
love God. For Plato love of God turns out to be 
equivalent to philosophy, and wisdom its result, 
whereas for Leibniz love of God only ensues 
from the cultivation of rational understanding 
and ·the growth of wisdom. What needs 
consideration now is how these two opposites 
might be redeemed through the notion of unity. 
However for both Leibniz and Plato this unity 
obscures the issue of imperfection. For Plato 
love of God/Good is possible only when 
material nature is transcended and for Leibniz, 
who posits this unity through our shared 
monadic substance with God, absolute unity is 
denied though our contingently created natures. 
No matter how far one delves into substantial 
unity one cannot escape the imperfection of 
created monads. How our authors deal with the 
problem of imperfection (seen in Christian terms 
as the problem of Theodicy) is beyond the scope 
of this discussion. However one promising 
avenue of research might be through 
Ramanuja's more robust conception of unity in 
difference within his doctrine of the Universe as 
the body of God. This task must, however, be 
left to my fellow contributors and respondents. 
Notes 
1 To put it another way, was the pop music producer 
Phil Spector correct when he wrote 'to know, know, 
know him is to love, love, love him' (a song 
ilmnortalised in 1958 by 'The Teddy Bears' and 
covered many times since) or is Plato right when he 
argues in three of his Socratic dialogues that 
knowledge of the good flows from love of the good-
that is wisdom flows from union? 
2 See particularly sections X: 24-30. Augustine, 
Confessions. Trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (London: 
Penguin Classics, 1961), pp. 230-32. 
3 Ignatius of Antioch, Letter to the Ephesians IX. 
Trans. Roberts-Donaldson. Christian Classics 
Ethereal Library, (http://www . ccel.org/fathers21 ANF-
0IlanfD1-16.htm#PI214 224344). 
4 Encyclical letter, Deus Caritas Est, of the Supreme 
Pontiff Benedict XVI to the Bishops, Priests, and 
Deacons, Men and Women Religious and all the lay 
faithful On Christian Love, Dec 252005. 
5 The extent of Leibniz's faithful practice of 
Christianity is put into doubt in Matthew Stewart's 
intriguing text The Courtier and the Heretic: Leibniz, 
Spinoza and the Fate of God, (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 2005). 
6 Or more precisely that his wisdom is worthless. 
Apology 21d - 24b. All references are to the Hacket 
edition of Plato, Complete Works. Ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) unless 
otherwise stated. 
7 The creation of Urania was not through sexual 
procreation but rather castration.' See Hesiod's 
Theog011Y II: 176-206. (http://www.sacred-
texts.comlcla/hesiodl theogoI1y.htm) 
8 We see this subversion in the Symposium where 
Alcibiades relates at length how his love for 
Socrates' remarkable gifts of dialectic turned the 
normally pursued youth into the pursuer, contrary to 
the norms of paiderastia. 
9 See Terrence Irwin, Classical Thought (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), p.l86. 
10 References to Leibniz's Monadology are from 
Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and other essays 
(Indianapolis Indiana: Hackett, 1991) 
11 The One emanates all things from itself without 
diminishment. Terrence Irwin, Classical Thought 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.194. 
12 The principle of sufficient reason is for Leibniz the 
logical counterpart to that which detennines a thing 
to be itself and not something else. Leibniz 
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understood this to be a necessary truth of a rational 
created order. (Monadology §32). 
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